Get a user's current directory

[Noah Friedman]

In article <1990Dec21.184617.8685 at cs.widener.edu> brendan at CS.WIDENER.EDU (Brendan Kehoe) writes:
>  Towards even better system management, this will let you find out
>what directories your users are sitting in. There's lots of room for
>improvement (e.g. taking an argument of a pid or username), etc.
>Anything you wanna do to it, feel free -- just send me a copy of
>whatcha did.
>
>[other comments and source code for program deleted]

   I can't imagine why anyone would want to use this unless they are
either incredibly nosy and have nothing better to do or they are so
paranoid they should have their head examined. Better system
management indeed. 

  But for those of you who *are* simply nosy, there is (usually) an
easier way to get the current working directory (or at least the
original cwd) of any process. Most shells have a PWD variable which,
if exported, you can examine using "ps wwe#pid" (or no # sign if
you're using SunOS 4.1) where pid is a process id. Admittedly not all
shells bother to export PWD. Csh is pretty stupid and does. Probably
tcsh does too. Of course, even if your victim is using one of these
shells, you can't see much of the environment for the login shell
because any variables set by the shell aren't in its own environment
proper - but they are exported to any child processes.

   As for looking for setuid programs, why not again use ps? I've
found this tool to be adequate.

   I'll give the author credit for actually playing with the kvm
libraries and kernel memory, as that was something I wanted to do
early on in my exploration of unix. But by the time I had the
necessary privileges I lost interest and the time to do it. Also, as
Mr. Kehoe writes, the kvm library is not portable and your mileage
will vary depending on your specific implementation (e.g. System V ps
won't show you the environment strings for a process, as far as I
know). 
   I would not consider this program any more than a curiosity, and I
plead with system administrators not to be more paranoid or
security-conscious than necessary.

---
Noah Friedman
friedman at ai.mit.edu