life critical software

[Walter Bright]

In article <9598 at nsc.nsc.com> glennw at nsc.nsc.com.UUCP (Glenn Weinberg) writes:
>In article <1857 at dataio.Data-IO.COM> bright at dataio.Data-IO.COM (Walter Bright) writes:
>> Boeing airplanes are a marvel
>>of safety and reliability as a result of such attention to detail.
>Not to be snide, but the recent FAA order requiring inspection of
>ALL Boeing jetliners made in the last 8 years for crossed wiring must make
>one wonder about just how much attention was really being paid to detail.
>But this incident really brings into question the test methodologies used
>by Boeing.

And you can bet that they will rework their testing to pick up this problem.
Also, note that the wiring problem was in the manufacturing, not the design
and my original posting was about the design.

Aircraft engineering procedures are a result of a long history of things
going wrong and methodologies developed to prevent human error. Past
examples are crossing control cables, and crossing hydraulic lines. Electrical
systems are newer, and thus there is less experience with them.
Software is newer still.

You ought to take a look at a cockpit with the skin off or the wheel
well, at the thousands of wires in huge bundles there are. 1 defect slipped
through. Is your software that good? I stand by my assertion that it's
a marvel.

P.S. I haven't worked for Boeing for years, and I'm not their spokesman.
Also, I didn't write software for them, I did gearbox design (!).