.plan

[Al Donaldson]

In article <2620 at trantor.harris-atd.com>, BA Badger points out that a
(programmable) terminal is vulnerable to any raw string that can be sent 
to the terminal.  For example, a couple of years ago one of my co-workers
read the manual for his terminal (a Freedom 100, I think) and found that
if you echoed a magic escape sequence to the terminal followed by some
command string, the terminal would automatically send the command string
back on the line just as if the user sitting at the terminal had typed it in.
I don't remember the exact terminal or magic sequence, but I do remember 
that it opened my eyes to a whole set of risks that I hadn't imagined before.

I think this is the same general problem that Doug Gwyn was talking about 
<10847 at smoke.BRL.MIL> when he answered a question about remotely simulating 
the pressing of a function key.  But in this case no function keys were used.
The only solution I know to this problem, short of using terminals that 
don't have such awful holes (unfortunately, the terminal designer and
most users probably see this as a "feature" instead of a hole) is to disable 
messages from other users to your terminal (e.g., "mesg n").

However, I am a little confused by the discussion about ANSWERBACK sequences
by BA Badger (above reference) and Bruce Barnett <1966 at crdgw1.crd.ge.com>.
As I remember, answerback sequences were used years ago in multidrop line
protocols to determine if a terminal was online and ready to receive before 
sending a message.  Surely answerback is not used by UNIX for this purpose,
so is the point that a nastygram can be stored in my terminal, triggered 
remotely by echo'ing a ctrl-E to my terminal, with the nastygram getting 
passed straight to my shell?   I apologize if this is obvious to others, 
but I just want to be sure I understand the risk.

Thanks,

Al Donaldson