security levels, V.4

[Ran Atkinson]

In article <1990Dec3.122925.1968 at odi.com>,
	 benson at odi.com (Benson I. Margulies) writes:

>Randall at virginia is misinformed:

No.  I was avoiding the use of technical jargon and avoiding
going into detail that I felt was inappropriate for this
audience.  That isn't nearly the same has being incorrect or
misinformed.  Next time don't be quite so quick to flame without
cause. 

I stand by my statement that a B system is harder to break into
(i.e. more trustworthy) -- realise that I (like most folks) 
consider a break in to be ANY form of unauthorised access to data 
or other compromise of system security in general.

>a B2 system has two things that no C system has (other than
>labels)
>1) trusted path:
>
>2) an implementation that passed must stricter muster with the DODCSC.
>B2 systems have to have full design documentation and meet some modularity
>standards. C systems just sort of have to have the features.

>Curious individuals should acquire copies of the orange book and 
>see for themselves.

I was looking at my personal copy when I wrote my comments.  I agree
that those interested in the topic should look at the original document.

Followups have been redirected to misc.security.