How to stop future viruses.
Dennis L. Mumaugh
dlm at cuuxb.ATT.COM
Sat Nov 12 05:35:33 AEST 1988
In article <778 at mailrus.cc.umich.edu> honey at citi.umich.edu (peter honeyman) writes:
>Dennis L. Mumaugh writes:
>>... I encrypted the dictionary FIRST. Then it was one
>>encrypt and a fgrep. From start to finish (copy of /etc/passwd
>>until printing of list of lognames and password was 45 minutes!).
>
>where did you store the gigabyte file? how long did it take to
>generate it? (25,000 word dictionary, 4,096 salts, 11 byte output
>each.)
>
I haven't done this in years, at the time I had a 300 meg disk to
work with.
Today my approach would be to analyze the salt and crypt to
verify just which salts are valid [some are not valid or are
rare]. Then I would build the dictionary of ~80000 entries plus
variants. Then I would encrypt it with all salts. I have 4
3b20's and 30 3B2's and some have gigabytes of SCSI disks. [ 6250
tapes with 200 ips drives are also a possibilitiy]. Hence I can
split the data into several places. All of this is done in
advance.
When the password file [or shadow] is found I split it into
equivalence sets and send the entries for each set to the
appropriate computer for munching. Hence to time to crack is the
time to search each file. Don't forget that your estimate is off
a bit too. I need the 13 byte encrypted version, a separator and
then the plain text. Thus it is 22 bytes x 80,000 x 4096 or
7,208,960,000 bytes of storage. With say 20 cpus and only 400
real salts I need 36,044,800 bytes per machine. I can automate
almost all of this and thanks to RFS and LAN's communcations
isn't the problem. The time is that to fgrep the 36 Meg file on
each machine. That runs about an hour depending on load and disk
performance.
The major point is that properly prepared one CAN crack passwords
in less than an hour given adequate resources.
--
=Dennis L. Mumaugh
Lisle, IL ...!{att,lll-crg}!cuuxb!dlm OR cuuxb!dlm at arpa.att.com
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