Improving password security

[Richard A. O'Keefe]

In article <522 at necisa.necisa.oz> boyd at necisa.necisa.oz (Boyd Roberts) writes:
>In article <741 at quintus.UUCP> ok at quintus.UUCP (Richard A. O'Keefe) writes:
>>[In reply to a claim that a password server would be vulernable to
>> having *one* machine go down.]
>>There is no reason why a password server could not be replicated.
>
>So, we'll just re-invent YP, again!?!  No point doing something badly, when
>you can get some other mindless jerk to do it _really_ badly.

As near as I can figure out, Boyd Roberts appears to be claiming that
every new replicated server is "some mindless jerk ... re-invent[ing] YP,
again ... _really_ badly".  Strange.  I thought replicated servers (e.g.
name-servers, time-servers) were around before YP was even dreamed of.
There was a lot of stuff from Xerox on "registries".

Calling a (distributed implementation of) a function remotely isn't
*quite* the same as using YP, but let it pass.