Implications of recent virus (Trojan Horse) attack

[Doug Gwyn]

In article <14465 at mimsy.UUCP> chris at mimsy.UUCP (Chris Torek) writes:
>In article <8845 at smoke.BRL.MIL> gwyn at smoke.BRL.MIL (Doug Gwyn ) writes:
>>The technical problems that were exploited were mostly sloppiness that
>>nobody had reviewed and corrected in time.  We know of a few other
>>similar security holes that the virus didn't try to exploit.
>Well, good grief, SEND THEM TO US.  WE *WILL* FIX THEM.  This is a
>large part of what comp.bugs.4bsd.ucb-fixes is about.  (Or do you mean
>that they are fixed in 4.3tahoe but not other 4BSD-derived systems?)

Last time I tried, there was a distinct lack of interest!

>>Try the following on your favorite remote 4BSD-based system:
>>	rlogin host -l ''

>Obviously this one has been fixed in 4.3tahoe.

Not necessarily.  Try the following:
	# vi /etc/passwd
	<insert an extra blank line, say at the end>
	$ passwd
	<change your password, say to the same thing it already is>
	$ su ''
	# suprise!
If this hole exists, it can be traced to getpwent() not being careful
enough when it parses /etc/passwd records.  See UNIX System V for the
simplest fix.