Password security - Another idea

[Roger Collins]

In article <4546 at xenna.Encore.COM> bzs at Encore.COM (Barry Shein) writes:
> 
> >I like some form of shadow passwords as a solution.  Once they're in place,
> >you no longer care what the user picks for a password, as long as it's N
> >characters long and not the account name.
> >
> >Keith Bostic
> 
> Round and round, and you're not disturbed at the fact that you're now
> relying on the unreadability of the shadow file? How many ways are
> there to read a read-protected file? How do you know it has been read
> by an unauthorized person (or a disgruntled employee)? If you suspect
> it has been read what is the appropriate action (I can answer that,
> change every password on the system, wotta nuisance.)
> 
> 	-Barry Shein, ||Encore||

Same reasoning:
Conventional door locks are not perfect.  So, rather than let myself be 
lulled into complacency by locking the door, I will just wait till newer 
technology makes a perfect lock.  Hell, I better start research now so 
my house can be safe once and for all.

Now, seriously:

	o  Almost every C programmer knows how to write a brute force
	   program to crack passwords in a readable password file.

	o  Only a very small percentage of Unix users (experts) know
	   about holes and such to read unreadable files.  (And a
	   knowledgeable administrator can decrease this percentage
	   by plugging these holes as they are made known by other
	   experts.)

	o  Shadow password file DOES NOT encourage people to use
	   sloppy passwords.  Your passwd program or /etc/motd
	   can be just as annoying as it ever was :).

	o  Security will still improve.  I'm sure that all security
	   development will NOT just stop because shadow passwording
	   solves all the problems.  The problem is not being "swept
	   under the rug."

Enough.

What ever happened to the campaign for comp.security or comp.unix.security or
whatever?

--
Roger Collins
rogerc at ncrcae.Columbia.NCR.COM